flaw empowers stealthy new class of super
A new Android design error discovered by Bluebox Security allows malicious apps to grab extensive control over a user’s device without asking for any special permissions at installation. The problem affects virtually all Android phones sold since 2010.
Bluebox calls the flaw “Fake ID” because it allows malware apps to pass fake credentials to Android, which fails to properly verify the app’s cryptographic signature. coque huawei coque samsung galaxy s9 plus nike dernières Instead, Android grants the anker coque iphone 6 rogue app all of the access permissions of whatever legitimate app the malware claims to be.
This is particularly serious because Google has granted a variety of trusted apps in Android broad permissions; by pretending to be one of these trusted apps, malware can can fool users into thinking that they are installing an app that doesn’t need any coque poney iphone 6 special permissions, then trick the system into giving it essentially full control of the device, with access to the user’s financial data, contacts and other private information, even data stored in the cloud.
Bluebox said it disclosed the flaw to Google three months ago. coque samsung galaxy a5 The company’s chief technology officer Jeff Forristal will detail how it was found and how it works in a presentation at BlackHat USA 2014, a security conference being held next week in Las Vegas.
Fake ID can exploit Flash to infect other apps
Among the trusted apps that can be spoofed by Fake ID is Adobe Flash, which Google deeply integrated into coque iphone 7 music Android’s web browser in an attempt to prove that mercedes coque iphone 6 Steve Jobs was wrong about Flash not being a good idea on mobile devices.
While Google eventually gave up on Flash for Android, an Adobe Flash plugin privilege escalation flaw remained embedded in Android’s webview the browser component that gets embedded into third party apps that present web content until the release of Android 4.4 KitKat last fall.
With Flash so deeply integrated into Android’s webview component, any malware coque iphone 6 rose et dore using Fake ID to pretend coque ysl iphone 6 to be Flash can subsequently escape Android’s app sandbox and take control coque iphone 6 paillette dur of other apps, including Salesforce and Microsoft OneDrive, grab data from those apps, sniff out all those apps’ network traffic and gain any additional privileges held by those apps. nike air force 1 Android Open Source Project forks including Amazon’s Fire OS and various packages used in China avis coque gorilla iphone 6 commandokieffer31599 are also susceptible to Fake ID
Google removed the Android webview Flash flaw from 4.4 KitKat last fall, but as of July 7, the company reports that less than 18 percent of its users have installed the new version.
The remaining 82 percent often can’t update because of well known issues with mobile carriers and manufacturers delaying or opting not to deliver an update.
Google itself decided it wasn’t worth it to offer a KitKat update to buyers of its Galaxy Nexus, despite the phone being less than two years old. Outside of Google Play, Android Open Source Project forks including coque givenchy iphone 6 plus Amazon’s Fire OS and various packages used in China are also susceptible to Fake ID.
Flash not required: Fake ID can spoof NFC, too
In addition to the broad coque manga iphone 4 Flash permissions that Google hardwired into Android, the company has also built into Android support for its own Google Wallet, tied to NFC payment data.
Using Fake ID, a malware app that asks the user for no special permissions at installation can subsequently pretend to be the Google Wallet app; Android will then provide the rogue app with all the permissions it gave coque tablette samsung a6 10 1 its own NFC infrastructure, which includes users’ financial data.
Another vector for exploit is 3LM, a MDM (mobile device management) package Google inherited when it acquired Motorola (and later abandoned). coque samsung coque samsung galaxy s20 nike dernières However, Bluebox noted that “various HTC, Pantech, Sharp, Sony Ericsson, and Motorola devices” incorporate Android 3LM code, enabling Fake ID to allow “partial or full device iphone 5 coques compromise by malware.”
Fake ID lets any app pretend to be any iphone 6 coque silicone rouge app
Bluebox added, “other devices and applications that depend upon the presence of specific signatures to authenticate an application may also be vulnerable. Essentially anything that relies on verified signature chains of an Android application is undermined by this vulnerability.”
Because Wallet, 3LM and other apps do not depend on the Flash / Android webview flaw, these other vectors of attack weren’t fixed in KitKat.
However, that still leaves wide open the “side loading” method of iphone 6 coque protectrice installing apps from other app markets, such as Amazon and the variety of stores operating overseas, including China, where Google maintains little control over Android.
Like Apple’s iOS app coque iphone 6 enveloppe signatures, without the verification part
Android apps are signed using the digital certificates of their developer, just like Apple’s iOS introduced in 2008.
Once cryptographically signed, an app can be verified as genuine by coque en silicone pour iphone 6 6s bleu nuit commandokieffer30518 the system; any subsequent tampering (such coque huawei p20 lite house as the addition of malicious viral code) will break the signature, allowing the system to refuse to run the app.
However, Bluebox discovered that “the Android package installer makes no attempt to verify the authenticity of a certificate chain; in other words, an identity can claim to be issued by another identity, and the Android cryptographic ouvrir coque huawei p8 lite code will not verify the claim (normally done by verifying the issuer signature of the child certificate against the public certificate of the issuer). coque iphone magasin nike “the Android package installer makes no attempt to verify the authenticity of a certificate chain” Bluebox
“For example, an attacker can create a new digital identity certificate, forge a claim that the identity certificate was issued by Adobe Systems, and sign an application with a certificate chain that contains a malicious identity certificate and the Adobe Systems certificate.
“Upon installation, the Android package installer will not verify the claim of the malicious identity certificate, and create a package signature that contains the both certificates. vente en ligne asics This, in turn, tricks the certificate checking code in the webview plugin manager (who explicitly checks the chain for the Adobe certificate) and allows the application to be granted the special webview plugin privilege given to Adobe Systems leading to a sandbox escape and insertion of malicious code, in the form of a webview plugin, into other applications.”
The company added, “you can see for yourself in the createChain() and findCert() functions of the AOSP [Android Open Source Project] JarUtils class there is a conspicuous coque antichoc iphone 7 plus femme absence of cryptographic verification of any issuer cert claims, instead defaulting to simple subjectDN to issuerDN string matching. An example of the Adobe Systems hardcoded certificate is in the AOSP webkit PluginManager class.”
There’s also another complication.